

Message Text

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R 291358Z AUG 73

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7101

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 12345

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: GW, GE, PFOR

SUBJECT: BAHR BRIEFING OF ALLIED AMBASSADORS ON
AUGUST 23 MEETING WITH GDR REPRESENTATIVE

REF: BONN 12187

1. SUMMARY: FRG MINISTER BAHR BRIEFED US, UK, AND
FRENCH AMBASSADORS AUGUST 28 ON HIS MEETING WITH GDR
REP KOHL IN EAST BERLIN. BAHR'S REPORT CONFIRMED SOME
OF WHAT WE LEARNED EARLIER (REFTEL). HOWEVER, BAHR
STRESSED THE SEEMING HARDENING OF THE GDR POSITION,
ESPECIALLY ON THE ISSUE OF EXFILTRATION. HE REPORTED
THAT KOHL AT ONE POINT EVEN SAID THE BERLIN AGREEMENT
COULD COME INTO DANGER IF THE FRG DID NOT TAKE MEASURES
TO BRING THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL. BAHR APPEARED TO
BE DRAMATIZING THE NATURE OF HIS TALKS WITH KOHL, BUT
THERE SEEMS TO BE NO DOUBT THAT HE IS GENUINELY CONCERNED
ABOUT GDR SENSITIVITIES IN A PARTICULARLY DELICATE

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AREA. WE SEE NO RPT NO NEED NOW FOR THREE POWER ACTION,

WHICH BAHR SEEMS TO WANT (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT ACTIVELY PURSUE THE POINT), BUT WE MAY AT SOME POINT HAVE TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF RAISING GDR THREATS TO THE BERLIN AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS. END SUMMARY.

2. BAHR CONFIRMED THE GENERAL TENOR OF OUR PRELIMINARY REPORTING ON HIS LAST ROUND OF TALKS WITH KOHL IN EAST BERLIN ON AUGUST 23 (REFTEL). HE SAID THE DISCUSSIONS WERE COMPLETELY UNSUCCESSFUL. HE TRIED TO GET SOME MOVEMENT IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERMANENT MISSIONS BUT TO NO AVAIL. KOHL INSISTED ON THE FRG MISSION'S BEING ACCREDITED TO THE GDR FONOFF AND OBJECTED TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL TO HAVE THE GDR MISSION ACCREDITED TO THE CHANCELLERY. KOHL ALSO INDICATED THAT A MEETING WITH BAHR IN OCTOBER WOULD BE SOON ENOUGH FOR THE GDR SIDE. HE ONLY AGREED TO A MID-SEPTEMBER MEETING WHEN BAHR POINTED OUT THE NEGATIVE IMAGE THIS WOULD PRESENT TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.

3. KOHL MADE A STRONG PROTEST AGAINST THE MISUSE OF THE GDR TRANSIT ROUTES FOR EXFILTRATION TO THE WEST OF GDR CITIZENS. HE SAID THE SITUATION WAS BECOMING INTOLERABLE FOR EAST BERLIN. THE GDR HAD ASKED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SENAT TO TAKE MEASURES TO END THE MISUSE BUT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. IF THEY WOULD TAKE NO STEPS, THEN THE GDR ITSELF WOULD ACT.

4. KOHL PROVIDED A LIST OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN EXFILTRATION ACTIVITIES, SOME OF THEM RESIDING IN WEST BERLIN, SOME IN THE FRG. HE PROPOSED FORMALLY THAT THESE PEOPLE BE HANDED OVER TO THE GDR, NOTING THAT SUCH AN ACTION WOULD PUT AN END TO THE PROBLEM. HE ADDED THAT THE GDR WAS PREPARED TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE FRG ON COOPERATION TOWARD THIS END.

5. BAHR REPLIED THAT THE GDR SEEMED TO WANT TO COMPLICATE THE ISSUE RATHER THAN RESOLVE IT. WHILE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO DISCOURAGE MISUSE OF THE TRANSIT ROUTES, IT WOULD NOT PASS NEW LAWS TO BRING THIS ABOUT. HE NOTED THAT THE TRANSIT

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TRAFFIC AGREEMENT HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE FRG WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD ONLY "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS POSSIBILITIES" TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO MISUSE.

6. BAHR COMMENTED TO KOHL THAT THE GDR MUST BE WELL AWARE THAT PASSING NEW LAWS IN THE FRG TO PREVENT EXFILTRATION WAS AN UNFULFILLABLE DEMAND. AS FOR THE HAND-

ING OVER OF THOSE INVOLVED IN EXFILTRATION, BAHR SAID HE REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. HE TOLD KOHL THAT IF THE GDR CONTINUED TO INSIST ON EITHER OF THESE MEASURES, THEN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE FRG WOULD RESULT.

7. KOHL THEN PROPOSED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CLOSE

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THOSE CURRENCY EXCHANGE FACILITIES IN THE FRG THAT DEALT IN EAST MARKS. HE CHARGED THAT THESE FACILITIES PERMITTED AN ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING IN EAST MARKS SINCE THEY HANDLED A CURRENCY THAT WAS USED IN EAST GERMANY AND NOT IN WEST GERMANY. THE RESULT WAS, IN EFFECT, WEST GERMAN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE GDR. WHEN BAHR TOLD KOHL THAT THE FRG COULD DO NOTHING IN THIS AREA EITHER, KOHL SAID THAT THE GDR WOULD THEN HAVE TO TAKE STEPS OF ITS OWN TO CONTROL THE SITUATION.

8. BAHR TOLD THE AMBASSADORS THAT HE CONSIDERED KOHL'S

SEVERAL DEMANDS TO INDICATE A HARDENING OF THE GDR POSITION. HE EMPHASIZED KOHL HAD IN FACT TOLD HIM THAT IF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO TAKE ACTION ON THE EXFILTRATION AND CURRENCY EXCHANGE PROBLEMS, THEN THE GDR WOULD ACT AND THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WOULD THEN BE PUT IN DANGER. BAHR SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WARNED KOHL AGAINST THE GDR'S CONSIDERING SUCH EXTREME MEASURES, HE WAS STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT
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THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME KOHL HAD ISSUED SUCH A THREAT AGAINST THE AGREEMENT SINCE ITS CONCLUSION. BAHR SAID HE DID NOT MIND IF THE AMBASSADORS OR THEIR GOVERNMENTS MADE USE OF KOHL'S THREATS AGAINST THE AGREEMENT TO INDICATE THEIR CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS.

9. FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID SOVIET AMBASSADOR YEFREMOV HAD RAISED THE EXFILTRATION MATTER WITH HIM IN EAST BERLIN IN JULY BUT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD REGARDED THIS AS A PRO FORMA DEMARCHE MADE UNDER GDR PRESSURE. THE FRENCH SIDE HAD REGARDED THE WHOLE AFFAIR AS A BLUFF AT THE TIME.

10. BAHR SAID THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE CASE A FEW MONTHS AGO, BUT THE ENTIRE PROBLEM HAD CHANGED ITS COMPLEXION BECAUSE OF THE GREATLY-INCREASED PUBLICITY GIVEN IT IN THE FRG NEWS MEDIA. THE GDR HAD ORIGINALLY CALCULATED JUST HOW MANY PEOPLE IT THOUGHT IT WOULD LOSE THROUGH ESCAPES AND EXFILTRATION AND HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS. THE MATTER HAD BECOME PUBLIC, HOWEVER, AND THUS POLITICAL IN NATURE. WHAT THE GDR HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN WILLING TO CLOSE ITS EYES TO NOW HAD BECOME A VITAL ISSUE FOR THE REGIME AND ONE THAT REQUIRED ENERGETIC ACTION.

11. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AGREED BUT SAID IT WAS UP TO THE GDR TO ENSURE THAT THE TRANSIT ROUTES WERE NOT ABUSED. HE HAD TOLD YEFREMOV THAT THE GDR SHOULD IMPOSE THE CONTROLS NECESSARY TO THIS END. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND INDICATED HIS CONCERN THAT THIS SOLUTION COULD BE DANGEROUS IF THE GDR IMPOSED EXTENSIVE CONTROLS, SINCE THIS COULD UNDERMINE THE ESSENTIAL FREE ACCESS ELEMENT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.

12. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND ASKED WHETHER THE FRG'S PROBLEMS WITH THE GDR SEEMED TO BE PART OF A GENERAL PATTERN OF DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EES GENERALLY. BAHR SAID HE THOUGHT NOT. HE REFERRED TO CHANCELLERY STATE SECRETARY GRABERT'S RECENT TALKS IN MOSCOW ON THE FRG'S PROBLEM WITH THE EES ON THE LEGAL ASSISTANCE/WEST BERLIN

ISSUE (SEE SEPTTEL FOR DETAILS).

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13. FRENCH AMBASSADOR REVERTED TO THE MATTER OF GDR CONTROLS, SAYING THAT THESE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, IF MINIMAL IN NATURE, TO BRING SOME CONTROL TO THE EXFILTRATION SITUATION. BAHR SAID THAT THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT SUCH CONTROLS MIGHT LEAD TO A CRISIS OVER BERLIN AND THE BERLIN AGREEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE GDR WOULD BE EXAMINING THE ENTIRE PROBLEM IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND WOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE SOVIETS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS WOULD BE EVIDENT AT THE NEXT MEETING WITH KOHL ON SEPTEMBER 13. HE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS TO THE SOVIETS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN.

14. ASKED FOR SOME STATISTICS AS TO THE NUMBER OF THOSE FLEEING THE GDR, BAHR SAID IT WAS ABOUT 1,000 PER MONTH, WITH 100 (ONE HUNDRED), I.E. TEN PER CENT, OF THOSE RESULTING FROM SOME MISUSE OF THE TRANSIT ROUTES. UK AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ANY FRG OR ALLIED ACTION AGAINST MISUSE OF THE TRANSIT ROUTES WAS NOT GOING TO SOLVE THE GDR PROBLEM, THEREFORE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE OTHER 90 PER CENT OF ESCAPEES WERE THOSE WHO CAME OUT MOST SPECTACULARLY, E.G., BY SWIMMING CANALS OR CRASHING

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TO RUEHCUISECSTATE WASHDC 7103
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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USMISSION BERLIN
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BORDERS. HE THOUGHT THE GDR WAS MANEUVERING SO AS TO BE
ABLE TO ASK THAT AIB#ESCAPEES BE HANDED BACK BY THE FRG.

15. WHEN FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVIS-
ABLE FOR THE FRG TO ACT AGAINST THOSE INVOLVED IN
EXFILTRATION IN WEST BERLIN, BAHR SAID THE SENAT WOULD
NEED ALLIED AUTHORIZATION TO DO SO. AMBASSADOR HILLEN-
BRAND SAID THIS IS A DELICATE ISSUE: THE ALLIES COULD
HARDLY PRESS ANY ACTION IN WEST BERLIN WHICH WOULD BE AT
ODDS WITH WHAT'S PERMITTED IN THE FRG. THE ALLIES
WOULD NOT WISH BECOME INVOLVED IN A DOMESTIC FRG DIS-
PUTE OVER WHAT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE DONE VIS-A-VIS
EXFILTRATORS.

16. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL

FOR THE FRG AND SENAT AUTHORITIES TO SEE WHETHER THE EXFILTRATING
ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT NOT BE VIOLATING OTHER
LAWS, E.G., TAX EVASION, NARCOTICS, ETC. (REF
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BERLIN 1403). BAHR SAID THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER WAS
UNDER STUDY.

17. US AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THE GDY HAD INDICATED
WHETHER IT FOUND GRABERT'S INTERVIEW ON EXFILTRATION
USEFUL (BERLIN 1301.). BAHR SAID KOHL HAD SO INDICATED.
UK AMBASSADOR THEN ASKED WHETHER A STATEMENT
FROM THE WEST BERLIN GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT ALSO BE USE-
FUL. BAHR SAID HE THOUGHT A STATEMENT FROM THE THREE
ALLIES WOULD BE MORE HELPFUL. US AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS
POINTED OUT THAT IF THE INTENTION WAS TO RAISE THE
ISSUE, THEN THE ISSUANCE OF STATEMENTS BY ANOTHER PARTY
OR PARTIES WAS A BAD IDEA SINCE THESE WOULD EXCITE
FURTHER INTEREST. BAHR SAID HE AGREED BUT THE TIME

MIGHT COME FOR AN ALLIED STATEMENT.

18. BAHR THEN TURNED TO THE MATTER OF THE TIMING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERMANENT MISSIONS. HE HAD HOPED TO HAVE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER BUT, IN LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH KOHL, HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED EVEN BY THE END OF OCTOBER. BAHR SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF ANY ENVISAGED FRG-GDR CIVIL AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS.

19. REGARDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION ON THE FRG-GDR GENERAL RELATIONS TREATY (GRTAD#KOHL CRITICIZED IT BUT DID NOT MAKE A MAJOR ISSUE OF THE IN FACT, HE DID NOT RAISE IT IN THE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS BUT ONLY ON THE EDGE OF THEM. HE NOTED THAT THE IAQ# COULD HAVE MADE A REAL FUSS BUT HAD ONLY PUT OUT TWO ARTICLES IN NUES DUESCHLAND WHICH DID NOT HAVE TO BE TFWEN#TOO SERIOUSLY.

20. UK AMBASSADOR PRESSED BAHR PLHE#MATTER OF THE PERMANENT MISSIONS, QUESTIONING WHEQN FE# GDR IDEA

OF ACCREDITATION TO THE FONOFF IN LIEU OF THE CHANCELLERY
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WAS REALLY A DIFFICULT POINT FOR THE FCM BAHR REPLIED INDIRECTLY THAT THE GDR HAD ALWAYS WAMTRS#MISSION TO BE TREATED LIKE A FOREIGN EMBASSY BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT PREPARED IN THIS CASE TO GO THAT FAR.

21. FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENTS WERE BECOMING IMPATIENT TO HAVE IR AMBASSADORS IN EAST BERLIN AND ASKED WHAT BAHR REASSESSMENT WAS IN VIEW OF THE UNFORTHCOMING GDR ATTITUDE ON THE PERMANENT MISSIONS. BAHR SAID THERE WERE TO POSSIBLE WAYS FOR THE GDR TO LOOK AT THE SITUATION. (WANTED THE THREE POWERS' AMBASSADORS IN EAST BERLIN ID THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY HELP THE FRG IN ITS DEALINGS O VHE#

TIMING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSIONS. OR ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GDR MIGHT HAVE THE IDEA THAT MKATTER# HOW IT ACTED WITH REGARD TO THE MISSIONS THE THE MEMBERS WOULD SEND THEIR AMBASSADORS IN ANY CASE. IT WAS UP TO

ALL CONCERNED TO JUDGE HOW TO ACT IN THIS SITUATION.

22. UK AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THE EXFILTRATION RLEM
MIGHT BE CONNECTED WITH THE SEEMINGLY STIFF GDR POSITION
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEIT#MISSIONS. BAHR

SAID HE THOUGHT NOT BUT NOTED THT THE FRG MEDIA'S PUB-
LICIZING THE EXFILTRATION MATTERMADE IT ALL THE MORE
DIFFICULT FOR THE GDR TO SWALLOW.

23. COMMENT: BAHR SEEMED TO WISH TO DRAMATIZE APPARENT HARDENING
OF THE GDR POSITION ON THE EXFILTRA-

NOTE BY OC/T: BONN 12345 (SEC 3 OF 4) #AS RECEIVED. CORRECTIONS
TO FOLLOW.

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TION ISSUE. ALTHOUGH THE USE OF DRAMA DOES NOT REPRE-
SENT A NOVEL TACTIC ON HIS PART, THERE IS A NEW AND
POTENTIALLY SERIOUS ELEMENT INTRODUCED BY THE GDR THREAT
OF ACTION AGAINST THE BERLIN AGREEMENT. BAHR OBVIOUSLY
WANTED THE THREE ALLIES TO BE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM. WE

DID NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE REALLY EXPECTED THE ALLIES TO TAKE ACTION IN WEST BERLIN AGAINST THE EXFIL-TRATORS OR EVEN TO ISSUE SOME STATEMENT. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID HOPE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD MAKE KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS IN SOME WAY THE WESTERN POWERS' CONCERN OVER THE IMPLICATION OF KOHL'S REMARKS.

24. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO PLAY DOWN THE POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM. WERE THE SOVIETS TO ALLOW THE GDR TO INSTITUTE A NEW AND STRICT CONTROL AT THE CHECKPOINTS AND ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES OR TO ESTABLISH CHECKS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PERSONS ENTERING UPON OR TRAVELING THE TRANSIT ROUTES HAD EAST MARKS IN THEIR POSSESSION, THEN THE SITUATION COULD TAKE ON VERY
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TROUBLING DIMENSIONS, DIRECTLY INVOLVING THE THREE POWERS WITH THE USSR.

25. IT IS HARD TO JUDGE FROM HERE JUST HOW FAR THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO LET THE GDR GO IN IMPOSING STRICT CONTROLS TO DEAL WITH EXFILTRATION, WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY MUCH MORE SERIOUS TO THE GDR THAN TRAVELERS' ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF EAST MARKS. WE WOULD THINK THAT THE SOVIETS ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN MUCH LARGER ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST DETENTE AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT ALLOW THE GDR TO DISTURB THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE BY BRINGING ABOUT A BERLIN CRISIS. THIS SEEMS PARTICULARLY THE CASE ON THE EVE OF THE OPENING OF CSCE AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THIS FALL.

26. THE PROBLEMS KOHL RAISED ARE SENSITIVE ONES FOR THE GDR, HOWEVER, AND THE EAST GERMAN REGIME WILL PROBABLY KEEP PRESSING THE USSR FOR WIDER MANEUVER ROOM. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THERE MAY COME A POINT WHEN WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER SENIOR ALLIED OFFICIALS SHOULD NOT MENTION TO THE SOVIETS OUR CONCERN OVER THE DEVELOPING GDR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT THE TIME TO CONSIDER SUCH A STEP IS NOW. (AN OPPORTUNITY MIGHT PRESENT ITSELF, HOWEVER, WHEN GROMYKO IS IN NEW YORK FOR THE UNGA THIS FALL. ON THE OTHER HAND, GROMYKO HIMSELF MAY RAISE THE PROBLEM WITH THE ALLIES IF THE SOVIETS ARE SUFFICIENTLY EXERCISED ABOUT IT.)
HILLENBRAND

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